In this study of educational policies aimed at migrants in France and Denmark, we examine how both countries display the same mixture of integration policies and of discourses of hostility portraying migrants as scapegoats. Educational policies are seen as a fundamental tool to speed up the integration of migrants, yet these are seen as a potential threat to national equilibrium and cohesion. This contradiction results from specific forms of policy construction and patterns of discursive spaces. This led us to argue, using the Foucauldian concept of governmentality, against a unified conception of the power yielded by the state on migrants.
to capture both regular and irregular foreign workers. (…) [The latter comprises] individuals who, while having his or her origins in another country, have become citizens of the host country" (ibid.). Yet these definitions, while appearing straightforward and based on factual elements, do not prevent both terms to be used interchangeably in public debates. The French context prohibits the use of ethnic categories in the compilation of statistics on migrants and their descendents, so the main divide is drawn between French and foreigners, based on the sole criteria of nationality and citizenship. However, the definition of 'immigrant' retained by the French counterpart to Statistics Denmark, the INSEE, blurs this line: 'an immigrant is a person who was born a foreign national in a foreign land and who lives now in France' (INSEE website, 2010) .
2 Statistics on immigrants therefore encompass foreigners but also naturalized French. As in Denmark, definitions pertaining to this hotly debated topic appear deceptively simplified, and the category of "migrants" is therefore mobilized as a factual term used to manage populations, yet it is inherently and simultaneously subjected to larger appropriations -for instance in the media (Bonnafous 1991) . While sticking to official denominations in this article, we take stock of this fluidity of meanings that is a key element of their multifaceted political uses.
Koopmans et al., in their conceptualization of citizenship in
Europe, provide a two-dimensional model helping us differentiate between the two countries:
On the vertical axis, the continuum runs from conceptions of citizenship that favour ethnic bonds as the basis for the constitution of the political community to those that emphasize equal civic rights and attribute citizenship on the basis of the territorial principle. (…) On the horizontal axis, the continuum runs from conceptions of citizenship that insist on conformity to a single cultural model that is to be shared by all citizens, to culturally pluralist conceptions that seek to retain, or even stimulate diversity and allow their subjects to follow a variety of cultural patterns. (Koopmans et al. 2005: 9-10) This model helps us to go beyond the somewhat simplistic representation of Denmark as a nation relying mainly on an ethnic definition of citizenship, while France has usually been presented as a good example of a civic regime. As we will see, in fact both countries have been relying for a long time on 'cultural monism' in their conception of integration, and France has been gradually moving away from pure 'civic-territorial' policies aimed at migrants, without opting for a full-fledged 'ethnic' model. From that perspective, there has been a convergence between the policies implemented in both countries, rendering their comparison even more interesting.
France and Denmark display the same strange mixture of integration policies anchored in the history of immigration policies and of discourses of hostility and rejection that tend to portray migrants as scapegoats. Educational policies are put in the foreground, namely in order to speed up the integration of migrants in the national community. Yet the fact that in both cases migrant subjects are seen as a potential threat to national equilibrium and cohesion complicates this aim. What we want to explain is this contradiction or this paradox that, we argue, is no accident, but the result of specific forms of policy construction and of patterns of discursive spaces. This conducts us to argue, using the Foucauldian concept of governmentality, against a unified conception of the power yielded by the state on migrants:
even if political discourses identify overarching rationales for policies aimed at migrants, such as the fight against unemployment, welfare state bankruptcy, or insecurity, in fact policies aiming at different objectives and using different instruments coexist. Acknowledging this fragmentary, even contradictory nature of educational policies aimed at migrants therefore leads us to re-evaluate the critical discourses stigmatizing the very real repressive turn of immigration and integration policies in Europe and hostile policies against migrants by arguing that the situation is in fact more complicated in both countries. However, in doing so -and in concentrating the analysis on the policy side -one is not giving in a unitary, overwhelming view of the state and its apparatuses. On the contrary, one is confronted with multiple sources of power, all of which aim at defining migrants as their primary target. Even if one does not seek to uncover "resistances', the very concept of 'power' is thus challenged by acknowledging its multiplicity (Coombe 2007: 285 1981-1986 and 1988-1992) , the different govern- (Jennings 2000: 582) . Assimilationist policies may well produce unwanted side-effects and indeed reinforce the exclu- In the eighties and nineties, refugees from all over the world thus settled in Denmark; and many refugees and migrants stayed as Since 2010, Denmark has further tightened its immigration rules via a points system, reflecting the perceived desirability of immigrants.
Denmark and immigration
Importantly, migrants can accumulate points based on language skills, education or work experience.
In Denmark, the first national integration policies were designed in 1983, with the publication of a 'Memorandum on Migration Policy' According to his/her educational level, each adult migrant is allocated to a Danish course and to a module. He/she has to develop an individual language learning plan. This individual plan has to be in line with his/her individual integration plan, which has been designed by the migrant, in collaboration with the social services in the municipality where he/she has settled.
Both France and Denmark have thus placed integration at the center of their immigration policies, in a context where the arrival of new migrants was generally portrayed as an issue to be tackled with repressive measures. Therefore the enabling aspects of integration have progressively given way to the setting of instruments aimed at policing the migrants' will to integrate in which cultural integration serves as a proxy to assimilation. In the next section, we will examine how educational policies aimed at migrants conjugate the goal of maximizing their contribution to the national economy and especially the labor market with this assimilationist stance.
3 Educational policies aimed at migrants: disparate and contested instruments to foster 'integration'
Integration policies in France: producing citizens as a primary goal
The demographic changes affecting immigration flows have had a strong impact on migrant children or children with a migrant background who were increasingly numerous in the French education system, since migrant children have the same rights and obligations to attend school as the French children, no matter their legal status.
At the beginning of the 1990s, foreign children accounted for 9.4% of all children in elementary school in France, compared with 7.7% in the mid-1970s. The rise in the rate of foreign children at school until the mid-1980s resulted from the policy of family reunification. Almost all the foreign children attend public schools. Immigrant families tend to have a lower income; besides, adaptation classes for children who do not speak French well are for the most part available in public schools. The number of foreign students in high schools has been steadily rising since 1975. This increase results from the lengthening of studies, apart from the consequences of family reunification, but it is now almost stabilized. There were 137,000 foreign students registered in French universities at the beginning of the 1990s, which amounts to 11.2% of the total student population.
The French school is therefore highly open to children of migrants, insofar as equal opportunities remain the rule. As a consequence, the French schooling system is, in principle, indifferent to differences, and it is this egalitarian and secular attitude that constitutes the means through which a direct link is created between each individual, called upon to be a citizen, and the political community to which he or she belongs, namely the French nation. recommended that the "positive aspects of colonization" be taught at school, or the difficulty to implement a multicultural orientation to the teaching of the history of religions, reveal that the French education system is required to perform much more with migrant children than helping them gain the qualifications they will need for their integration in the labor market.
Integration policies in Denmark: language and employment as central concerns
As is the case in France, the Danish educational system is mainly public, with more than 87% children attending public schools, and attainment, and by ensuring that they learn to be good, loyal and law-abiding citizens. In short, because of the growing awareness of the fact that the schooling system alone cannot produce integration and that wider social networks play an important role in this process, children of migrants are invited to adopt a cultural and social world that ignores or even depreciates their familial origins.
Do integration policies in both countries mirror the turn from an assimilationist stance to an exclusionary project?
We find that integration policies in both France and Denmark pursue multiple aims simultaneously. This can be explained by the genealogy of these policies: they were initially designed to help integrating migrants socioeconomically into the host society, illustrating the Foucauldian analysis of governmentality as the historical development of policy instruments which take the national economy and wealth as their primary aims (Foucault 2001: 655-659) . However, the repressive turn taken by integration policies reveals a shift from this governmentality perspective. Migrants are no longer policed in order to be incorporated in the national economy (although in a subaltern position); they are treated as potential threats to the nation-state.
Therefore, integration policies also aim at preventing migrants from being a menace to the national culture or civilization by ensuring that they adhere to certain cultural traits, to which the national language Both in France and in Denmark, educational policies have historically been used as a way to reinforce the state by means of crafting law-abiding citizens (Kivinen and Rinne 1998: 44-45 ). This explains why in both countries we witness an overwhelming dominance of the public schooling system and a state monopoly over key aspects such as the delivery of diplomas and the fixation of curricula, which are managed by centralized bureaucracies. Incorporating new subjects in increasingly varied educational facilities and developing new policy instruments addressing the "migrant pupil issue" acts as a way to reinforce these institutions. Yet the multiple aims assigned to these instruments seized by a variety of actors -teachers, social workers, the police, etc. -contribute to the multiplicity of the sources and forms of power imbued in policies, thereby reinforcing their "assemblage" structure -that is, the opposite of a monolithic conception of institutions (Coombe 2007: 284 ) -which allows a loud repressive discourse on migrants while continuing to integrate them in the labor market. In the last section, we will focus on how discourses critical of the achievements of educational policies may fit within this Otherism paradigm.
4 Educating the 'disintegrated': an impossible goal to achieve?
In France: an assimilated 'universal' subject?
The French schooling system is today faced with having to address the increased ethnicization of the difficulties associated with schooling migrants and children of migrants and the implications that this has for school relations (among teachers and pupils, teachers and parents, pupils of different 'ethnic' origins) and discrimination in education (segregation, orientation practices). At the same time, the increased politicization of ethnic identities within schools and in public discourse creates a double bind for educators and policy makers who cannot respond effectively to these issues without compromising on the basic principles of equal, secular Republican education.
The Republican taboo on ethnic, religious, or cultural origins blinds the schooling system to an ever-widening gap between the principles underpinning National Education -equality, tolerance, non-discrimination on the basis of group differences -and the ordinary practices which take place daily within its 'jurisdiction'. Moreover, this taboo prevents the institution and its professionals from conceptualizing and addressing the question of discrimination as it takes place in education and within the school. Yet it does not limit the multiplication of discourses claiming to unveil this taboo issue or point to the "state of denial" in which French policymakers are concerning migrants' educational achievements (Lagrange 2010) . there are significant differences according to the country they come from. 7 Among the reasons explaining this low educational attainment, researchers point mainly to language problems, low level of parental education, or the fact that many of them marry at a very young age (Jakobsen, Smith 2003) . In many official publications, however, bilingualism itself is considered as a burden and is quoted as a main reason for low educational attainment of children of immigrants, with more than 9% of pupils in primary and secondary schools being bilingual (DG 2003: 11-12) . More often than not, the mother tongue of migrants and their children is also depicted as primitive, not 'useful', by opposition to more 'modern' languages, a category to which Danish obviously belongs (Jørgensen 2003: 76) . In other words, in official discourses, it is mainly the cultural background -mainly the type of family and bilingualism -of migrants or children of migrants that is deemed responsible for their low educational attainment, and not the potential inadequacy of policies. These poor educational results in turn explain their failed assimilation, and migrants are seen as responsible for their fate.
In the media though, the stress is increasingly put on the migrants' unwillingness to integrate and on their wish to profit from the system (especially the welfare state), without actually contributing to it by entering the workforce, or for children of migrants, by acquiring the necessary qualifications (among which, linguistic skills) for doing so. As a consequence, the pressure on the education system is very heavy, and the children of migrants are victim of a 'push and pull' factor: they face an injunction to assimilate, but at the same time even when their educational attainment is good, they often feel rejected because of racism and are suspected of not being loyal and abusing the system. As is the case in France, in the media they are portrayed as trouble-makers, prone to violence or delinquency, and unwilling to be 'good citizens'. They embody this 'cultural other' whose inner characteristics prevent their integration. As such, children of migrants might be fighting a losing battle.
Conclusion
In Denmark as in France, we see that despite all educational policies and programs that were set up in the last few decades, migrants are at the core of several controversies, public debates and discourses about education and are often portrayed as a threat to 'cultural homogeneity'. They are therefore urged to integrate, and in the absence of such assimilation, they are seen as an economic burden and as a security threat. In France, the official refusal to consider migrants' origins not only hampers the setting up of appropriate educational policies, but also makes the fight against racism and discrimination more difficult in a context where discourses blaming migrants' backward cultures thrive. In Denmark, the recent and tougher stance on immigration and integration, displayed both at official and civil society levels, increasingly puts the responsibility for educational achievement and integration on the shoulders of migrants themselves. However, we see that in spite of diverging ideologies regarding the management of cultural diversity, both countries have come to adopt a similar goal -with language learning as a central lever -that is, cultural assimilation as opposed to the socioeconomic or even political one. Dean 1999), be it multi-level governance (as in both our European cases) or burgeoning public-private partnerships. Yet the wide uses of the concept may lead to the dissolution of its explicative capacity (Coombe 2007: 284) . Governmentality puts the emphasis on government techniques, with the population being the main object for policy.
In our cases it materializes in the wide use of quantitative tools to evaluate public policies and especially educational achievements.
However, such tools are inherently at fault either because of ideological limitations on the dimensions being monitored like in France or because their avowed aim to evaluate the future socioeconomic integration of migrant pupils does not match the real objective to warn against dangers threatening the countries.
However, we are reminded that governmentality stretches both inside and outside the state (Foucault 2001: 656) : what may be governed is not determined solely by the state but also in a relative consensus with civil society or public opinion. For instance, the framing of migrants as a potential threat to the nation (national identity, good governance, security, etc.) derives not only from repressive public policies but also from the coexistence of integrationist policies with exclusionary discourses. In France, it materializes in contradictions between the contemporary policy discourse treating migrants as an economic asset and the prevalence of discursive strategies portraying them as unassimilable. In Denmark, similar contradictions may be identified between educational policies aimed at developing migrants' social capital and their depiction as burdens to the welfare state. Here the concept of assemblage is useful, since it helps conceptualizing the limits of governmentality.
Does the prevalence of negative evaluations of education policies aimed at migrants point towards a failure of this assemblage? It is an object of constant public debate, and even politicians who are or have been members of the Danish and French governments are keen on emphasizing the failure of the schooling systems to integrate migrants. We argue that such critical discourse is more related to Otherism than to a project to reform educational policies. The stress put on migrant pupils' low educational attainment mainly points to the majority's achievement and children of migrants can almost be considered as scapegoats in a time of crisis. As shown by René Girard, scapegoats have always been used in order to reinforce the group's sense of unity, they are arbitrary victims in the sense that they are not directly responsible for the problems that the community faces, but they usually share similar cultural traits that place them on the border of the community (Girard 1986 ). Would governmentality ultimately be possible without this conceptualization of potential "enemies from within? The goals that are set for educational policies are not likely to be met, and indeed it looks like children of migrants are used as a benchmark in educational policies: pointing at their low educational attainment serves to comfort the others about their own achievements, especially in a period of 'crisis'. We might even go further and suggest that these educational goals are not all meant to be reached in the case of children of migrants. The categorization at the heart of governmentality practices (Christie and Sidhu, 2006: 455) The reasoning also applies to young offenders: "The individual family is also responsible for keeping their children out of crime.
The government will strengthen parental responsibility by offering parents who do not support their children's education or follow up if their children commit crime that they can attend programmes intended to teach them to understand and accept their responsibility. If they fail to observe specific orders, it will be possible to reduce their family allowance" (MRII 2005: 4) .
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For instance, according to Jakobsen and Smith (2003: 16) , Pakistani young immigrants fare a lot better at university level than do Turkish young immigrants.
